Now the dust has settled : The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 by Norrie, Kenneth
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Norrie, Kenneth (2014) Now the dust has settled : The Marriage and Civil 
Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014. Juridical Review, 2014 (2). pp. 135-163. 
ISSN 0022-6785 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/48651/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 




Now the Dust has Settled: The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 
2014 
by 
Kenneth McK. Norrie 




On February 4, 2014, the Scottish Parliament (in a free vote) passed the Marriage 
and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 by 105 votes to 18 ± which is just shy of 
six votes in favour for every one against.  Of the countries that have, so far, opened 
marriage to same-sex couples, only Iceland (where the vote in favour was 
unanimous) and Sweden (where the vote in favour was 11 times that of the vote 
against) attained a larger proportion of parliamentary support.  This broad 
parliamentary consensus might appear surprising given the fierceness of the debate 
the Bill generated in the media, but it should be remembered that if religious 
arguments were excluded from the general media coverage of the issue there was 
virtually no call to deny equal marriage rights to same-sex couples.  The power of 
religion to influence public policy and legislation has been proved to be minimal in 
present-day Scotland, and the choice of this issue by faith-based organisations as 
the means to assert influence may well come to be seen as counter-productive. 
This article has two main purposes.  It seeks, first, to explore why opponents to 
same-sex marriage, who campaigned long and hard against what became the 
Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, ultimately failed to prevent its 
passing.  Secondly, and more prosaically, it seeks to explain how, precisely, this Act 
has changed family law in Scotland.  The overall theme will be that the changes 
should be seen in terms of the completion of a long-term project to make marriage 
gender-neutral ± and as such are far less threatening than opponents perceived, and 






I. WHY OPPONENTS LOST THE ARGUMENT 
 
The Moral Argument 
The fundamental proposition upon which gay and lesbian claims to equality are 
based is that sexual orientation is morally neutral, that gay and lesbian people are no 
worse (nor any better) than non-gay and non-lesbian people.  An increasing majority 
of the British population holds this belief,1 though it is by no means universally 
accepted: its denial today is traced almost exclusively to one source, religious 
doctrine.  As Kay Goodall puts it,2 UHOLJLRQ LV ³WKH RQO\ SRZHUIXO FXUUHQW HWKLFDO
framework in Western states which holds sexual orientation to be a relevant factor by 
ZKLFKWRPDNHIXQGDPHQWDOMXGJPHQWVDERXWWKHZRUWKRILQGLYLGXDOV´%RWK&KULVWLDQ
and Islamic theology can point to scriptural authority for holding homosexuality to be 
a sin3 and the conclusion that same-sex relationships are, therefore, less worthy of 
WKHODZ¶VQXUWXULQJWKDQRSSRVLWH-sex relationships is, from that starting point, entirely 
rational.  If that is so then it should barely matter what structural design the law puts 
in place for same-sex couples and opposition to decriminalisation, or civil 
partnership, or adoption rights, or the extension of non-discrimination norms to 
sexual orientation should be no less vigorous than opposition to same-sex marriage.  
In the event, the opposition to same-sex marriage in the UK and elsewhere has been 
substantially greater than that shown to civil partnership, or employment protection, 
or general discrimination law, ZKLFK VXJJHVWV WKDW ³PDUULDJH´ LV SHUFHLYHG DV
something more than a means of legal regulation of family relationships. 




 British Social Attitudes Report, National Centre for Social Research, 2010, table 2.6.  See also the 
breakdown of these statistics offered in the Stage One Debate on the Bill that became the Marriage and Civil 
Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014: Official Report November 20, 2013, at col. 24641 
2
  “ŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ,ĂƚĞ^ƉĞĞĐŚ P/ŶĐŝƚĞment to Hatred on Grounds of Sexual Orientation in England, Wales and 
EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?/Ŷƚ ?: ?,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ ? ? ?ĂƚƉƉ ? ? ? ?-216. 
3
 In the Bible, the disapproval of same-sex relationships is sometimes direct and harshly unequivocal (as in 
Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13), sometimes opaque but suggestive (Romans 1:26-27), and sometimes allegorical (as 
ǁŝƚŚ>Žƚ ?ƐŽĨĨĞƌƚŽƐĂĐƌŝĨŝĐĞŚŝƐĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌƐƚŽŐĂŶŐƌĂƉĞƚŽƐĂǀĞƚŚĞĂŶŐĞůƐĨƌŽŵŵĂůĞƌĂƉĞ P'ĞŶĞƐŝƐ ? ? P ? ? ?>Žƚ ?




Those who adhere to an ethical framework built upon religious doctrine have the 
greatest of difficulty in persuading law and policy makers that scriptural authority is a 
sufficient foundation for law reform (or its resistance) in a secular democracy.4  
Recognising this, few of the published responses from religious bodies to the 
Scottish and the British consultations on opening marriage to same-sex couples5 
restricted themselves to asserting scriptural authority to justify their opposition.6  
Some, such as the Roman Catholic Church, explicitly deny the underlying 
proposition of moral neutrality7 but even they, as well as those who accepted (or at 
least conceded) that proposition, tended to focus on the social or political harm that 
they conceived would result from allowing same-sex marriage.  However, any 
organisation seeking to protect itself from having rules contrary to its beliefs imposed 
upon it renders itself vulnerable if at the same time it argues that its own beliefs 
should be embodied in legal rules to be imposed on everyone else.  This, together 
with the vastly diminished support that the denial of moral neutrality of sexual 
orientation attracts today, meant that the moral arguments put forward by religious 
organisations simply had no purchase, with either the public or the Scottish 
Parliament. 
 
The Immutability Argument 
                                                            
4
 In McFarlane v. Relate (Avon) Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 880, Laws LJ at paras. 22-25 provides one of the most 
eloquent defences of secular reasoning to be found in the British law reports, but this is by no means a 
modern phenomenon: see Bowman v. Secular Society [1917] AC 406, especially Lord Sumner at pp. 454 and 
464-465. 
5
 The Registration of Civil Partnerships; Same Sex Marriage: A Consultation, Scottish Government September 
2011; Equal Civil Marriage: A Consultation, Government Equalities Office, March 2012.   Responses to the 
Scottish consultation may be found at www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/07/9221; responses to the 
English consultation have been accessed via the websites of individual institutional respondees. 
6
 Only those religious organisations that adopt an absolutist position, preferencing their own interpretations of 
'ŽĚ ?ƐůĂǁƚŽƐƚĂƚĞůĂǁ ?ĨĞůƚĂďůĞƚŽĚŽƐŽ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞ&ƌĞ ŚƵƌĐŚŽĨ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ŽŶƚŝŶƵŝng) issued a press 
statement to accompany its response to the Scottish consultation, accessed from www.fccontinuing.org P “tĞ
submit that there can be no equality between heterosexual marriage based on a natural attraction and 
ŚŽŵŽƐĞǆƵĂůƵŶŝŽŶƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶǁŚĂƚƚŚĞŝďůĞƚĞƌŵƐ  ‘ǀŝůĞĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?  ?ZŽŵĂŶƐ  ? P ? ? ? ? ? dŚĞDƵƐůŝŵŽƵŶĐŝů ĨŽƌ
Scotland explained in the introduction to tŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ P  “/ƐůĂŵĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĐŽŶĚŽŶĞŚŽŵŽƐĞǆƵĂůďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ŝŶ
any shape or form, therefore conducting such ceremonies on the religious premises of Muslims is totally 
unacceptable to the entire Muslim community.  Any moves in this direction will be resisted by the community 
ǁŝƚŚĂůůƚŚĞǀŝŐŽƵƌĂƚƚŚĞŝƌĚŝƐƉŽƐĂů ? ?
7
 In a press release issued on 25
th
 March 2012, the Catholic Archbishop of Glasgow justified his opposition to 
same-ƐĞǆŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚ “ĂƐƐĞƌƚƐƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞĂŶĚƐĂŵĞ-sex unions, 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨĐŚĂƐƚŝƚǇ ? P^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚĂƚŚŽůŝĐDĞĚŝĂKĨĨŝĐĞ ?Press Releases. 
4 
 
A common theme running through many of the religious responses to the 
Consultations of the UK and the Scottish Governments is the (surprisingly parochial) 
argument that marriage has been long understood to involve one man and one 
woman, and as such it is an immutable institution that is simply outwith governmental 
competence to change.8  This is the ostensibly theological (though tendentious) point 
that the definition of marriage is set, either by nature or by the Judeo-Christian God9 
and so cannot be changed by legislative action of men.10  The Church of England, 
IRUH[DPSOH³GLVSXWHWKHULJKWRIDQ\JRYHUQPHQWWRUHGHILQHDQDJHV-old institution 
LQ WKH ZD\ SURSRVHG´11  The obvious answer to this, of course, is that insofar as 
marriage is a legal institution designed for legal purposes, it is open to law-makers to 
redesign that institution, as it has done many times in the past, even to the extent of 
altering its essential nature.12  Renata Grossi points out that social understandings of 
what marriage is actually for has changed throughout history.  She suggests that the 
same-sex marriage debate pits the idea of marriage as a relationship for procreation 
against the idea of marriage as a relationship for love.  Romantic love as the 
foundation of marriage, she points out, was until the mid-19th century regarded as 
GDQJHURXVO\UDGLFDOIRUVXEYHUWLQJVRFLHW\¶VH[SHFWDWLRQVDQGDOORFDWLRQVRIUROHVEXW
today of course love is perceived (at least in the developed world) as the only 
satisfactory basis for marriage.13  Marriage as an institution has always served social 
purposes, and as these purposes change so too does the institution.  Asserting the 
immutability of marriage is to ignore the reality of social evolution as a driver of legal 
change. 
                                                            
8
 The same point was made by  Elaine Smith, MSP, in the Stage One Debate, Official Report November 20, 2013 
at col. 24654. 
9
 The God of Islam, in most Islamic traditions, defines marriage differently and at least contemplates polygyny 
within that definition: see R. Arshad Islamic Family Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 2010).  Indeed, given that 
Abraham had many wives (Genesis 16:3 and 25:1) the God of Abraham had a definition of marriage that did 
not exclude polygamy  W though social practice changed that definition very early for two of the three 
Abrahamic religions 
10
 The immutability argument tends to be emphasised by the more hierarchical denominations of Christianity.  
Those with a flatter membership structure, while opposing same-sex marriage on doctrinal grounds, often 
accept that their members have the capacity to change their doctrinal beliefs: see for example the responses 
to the Scottish 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛconsultation of the Church of Scotland and the Methodist Church in Scotland. 
11
  ŚƵƌĐŚŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐKĨĨŝĐĞŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƋƵĂůŝǀŝůDĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ? June 
2012, at para 8. 
12
 For example, an indissoluble union is of a very different nature from one that, with more or less ease, can be 
escaped from by the parties. 
13
  “dŚĞDĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ>ŽǀĞŝŶƚŚĞĞďĂƚĞĨŽƌ>ĞŐĂůZĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ĂŵĞ-^ĞǆDĂƌƌŝĂŐĞŝŶƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?/Ŷƚ ?: ?




The Definition Argument 
In truth, marriage as a legal institution is as malleable as the law makes it, and the 
law may use whatever word it chooses to describe that institution.  While the law will 
usually seek to use words in their every-day, social, meaning, this is not always 
possible ± if for no other reason than that every word in the English language has 
PRUHWKDQRQHPHDQLQJ7KHZRUG³PDUULDJH´LVQRWVRXQLTXHO\XQDPELJXRXVWKDWLW
must be off-limits to legislators.  Words, as well as institutions, can develop 
meanings different from, even opposite to, what they were understood to mean in an 
HDUOLHU DJH  7KH ZRUG ³JD\´ LWVHOI LV D SHUWLQHQW H[DPSOH IRU RQO\ LQ WKH ODVW ILIW\
years or so has it come to mean, entirely unambiguously, homosexual, thus 
depriving (it might be thought) the English language of a useful little word to describe 
carefree and lighthearted joy.14  7KHZRUG³PDUULDJH´FHQWXULHVDJRPRYHGDZD\LQ
RQH RI LWV PHDQLQJV IURP LWV HW\PRORJLFDO URRWV ³PDWULPRQ\´ RU WKH RIILFH of 
mother15) to become the relationship itself.  The word in the modern world is used to 
describe a huge variety of different institutions and states of being, including 
relationships involving more than two people, relationships irrespective of gender 
mix, and relationships where the age and consent of the parties is neither here nor 
there: they may well be marriages of which we disapprove but we would seldom say, 
as Lord Penzance said in Hyde v. Hyde16 that, whatever these relationships are, they 
DUH QRW ³PDUULDJH´  $QG WKH ZRUG RI FRXUVH KDV PHDQLQJV RWKHU WKDQ WKDW RI D
FRQMXJDO UHODWLRQVKLS DV D XQLW\ RI SXUSRVH ³D PDUULDJH RI PLQGV´ RU DV D
FRPPLWPHQW ³PDUULHG WR \RXU MRE´ RU QDXWLFDOO\ WR Vplice a rope, or marry its 
VWUDQGV7RDSDUWLFXODUW\SHRIUHOLJLRXVEHOLHYHU³PDUULDJH´LVDSDFWZLWK*RGRUD
sacrament; to a non-believing secularist a marriage is a civil contract that carries 
various legal consequences.  All of this shows that the word has a variety of social 
as well as legal and religious meanings, and that neither lawyers nor theologians can 
claim exclusive rights to it.  If the word does not belong to the Judeo-Christian God, 
the only question is whether the law should give its imprimatur to a wider meaning 
                                                            
14
 This remains the first meaning of the word offered by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (6
th
 edn, 2007), 
ďĞĨŽƌĞŵŽǀŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ “ŝŵŵŽƌĂů ? ? “ĨŝŶĞ ? ? “ƐŚŽǁǇ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞ ƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƐ “ŐĞǇ ? ?Žƌ “ŐĂǇ ? ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨĂŝƌůǇ ?ƉƌĞƚƚǇ
ŵƵĐŚ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞƐĞǀĞŶƚŚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ P “ŽĨŽƌƉĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŽŚ ŵŽƐĞǆƵĂůƐ ? ?
15
 ^ĞĞ,ĂǇƐ ?Lectures on Marriage (1533, reprinted by the Stair Society vol. 24, 1967) at p. 15. 
16
 [1866] LR 1 PD 130 at 133. 
6 
 
than the word has hitherto been legally accorded in the past.  The answer to that 
question must be found in law or social policy, not theology. 
 
Complementarianism 
Professor Lynn Wardle, a US commentator on family law based at the Brigham 
Young University in Utah, sees marriage as an institution that mediates the 
relationship between the genders.17  :DUGOH FRQVLGHUV WKDW ERWK JHQGHUV ³PDNH
essential (and complementary) contributions to the crucial social institutions of 
PDUULDJHDQGWKHIDPLO\´EHFDXVHPHQDQGZRPHQ³DUHLQKHUHQWO\DQGFDWHJRULFDOO\
different in profound and complementary ways (equDOEXWGLIIHUHQW´18  This is part of 
his secular argument that the very purpose of marriage is to provide a mechanism to 
deal with that difference, but it has very clear ± and very deep ± religious roots.  Both 
the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England, which share an historical 
antipathy to women in positions of leadership, found on a weltanschauung in which 
women play (and should play) a different role in life to that played by men.  They 
FODLP WKDW WKH UROH SOD\HG E\ ZRPHQ LV ³HTXDO´ WR WKDW Slayed by men (though of 
course it never really works out that way19  7KH 5RPDQ &DWKROLF %LVKRSV¶
&RQIHUHQFH IRU (QJODQG DQG :DOHV UHVSRQGLQJ WR WKH %ULWLVK *RYHUQPHQW¶V
consultation, made much of their conception of a world divided into two genders, 
equal in status (except in terms of leadership) but with different roles to perform in 
life. Marriage is the living expression of this difference: 
³7KHUHODWLRQVKLSFRQVWLWXWHGE\ WKH LQVWLWXWLRQRIPDUULDJH LVGLVWLQFW IURPDOO
other human relationships.  Its unique distinguishing characteristics centre on 
                                                            
17> ?tĂƌĚůĞ ? “dŚĞ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨDĂƌƌŝĂŐĞĂŶĚKƚŚĞƌŽŵĞƐƚŝĐZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŵƐƚĞƌĚĂŵ>Ăǁ&ŽƌƵŵ ? ? ? ?;
 “dŚĞƚƚĂĐŬŽŶDĂƌƌŝĂŐĞĂƐƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶŽĨĂDĂŶĂŶĚĂtŽŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?EŽƌƚŚĂŬŽƚĂ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ? ? ? ? 
18
 Wardle (2009) at pp. 162-163. 
19
 Ɛ&ƌĂŶĐĞƐZĂĚĂǇƉƵƚƐŝƚ P “ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞŝŵĂŐĞŽĨ'ŽĚŝƐĞŶƚƌĞŶĐŚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ
books of the three monotheisms, they nevertheless actively promote gender hierarchy in the religious 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚŵŽƐƚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĨĂŵŝůǇ ? P “^ĂĐƌĂůŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞWĂƚƌŝĂƌĐŚĂů&ĂŵŝůǇŝŶƚŚĞ
DŽŶŽƚŚĞŝƐƚŝĐZĞůŝŐŝŽŶƐ P ‘dŽEŽ&ŽƌŵŽĨZĞůŝŐŝŽŶŝƐtŽŵĂŶ/ŶĚĞďƚĞĚĨŽƌKŶĞ/ŵƉƵůƐĞŽĨ&ƌĞĞĚŽŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?/Ŷt. 
J. Law in Context 211 at 211. 
7 
 
the biological complementarity of male and female and on the possibility of 
FKLOGUHQ´20 
They concluded from this that the law should continue to grant special privileges to 
male-female couples (implicitly, sRORQJDVWKH\³PDUU\´LQWKHOHJDOVHQVHVLQFHLWLV
to the good of society (by being for the good of children) that individuals design their 
lives in male-female LPSOLFLWO\³PDUULHG´units (whether or not they themselves have 
children). 
  
The Church of England also put complementarianism at the heart of its response to 
WKH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VFRQVXOWDWLRQ0DUULDJHWKH\VDid, benefits society in many 
ways, not only by promoting mutuality and fidelity, but also by acknowledging an 
underlying biologiFDO FRPSOHPHQWDULW\ ZKLFK IRU PDQ\ LQFOXGHV ³WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI
SURFUHDWLRQ´21  )XUWKHU DQG UHIOHFWLQJ WKH SRLQW WKDW OLHV DW WKH KHDUW RI :DUGOH¶V
position,  
³PDUULDJHKDV IURPWKHEHJLQQLQJRIKLVWRU\EHHQ WKHZD\ LQZKLFKVRFLHWLHV
have worked out and handled issues of sexual difference.  To remove from 
the definition of marriage this essential complementarity is to lose any social 
LQVWLWXWLRQLQZKLFKVH[XDOGLIIHUHQFHLVH[SOLFLWO\DFNQRZOHGJHG´22  
There is of course a very long theological tradition that takes from scripture a divinely 
ordained separation of the roles of the genders, where it is the male role to lead and 
the female role to support.23  The genders are of equal worth, but are different ± they 
have (it is said) complementary roles.  The very structure of many churches, the 
Roman Catholic Church most obviously, reflects this complementarianism and it 
underpins the continued opposition in, for example, the Church of England to women 
                                                            
20
 ZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂƚŚŽůŝĐŝƐŚŽƉƐ ?ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚĂŶĚtĂůĞƐƚŽƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶ
 ?ƋƵĂůŝǀŝůDĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?, June 2012, at para. 17.  So too the (Roman Catholic) Bishops ? Conference of Scotland 
placed complementarity at the heart of its argument.  At the Stage One debate, their view is reported (Official 
Report ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐŽů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌŝƚǇĂƐ “ƚŚĞŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ ?ŽĨĂŶĚ
 “ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůďĂƐŝƐ ?ĨŽƌŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?The Muslim Council of Scotland made the same point when it responded to the 
^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ P “Marriage is recognised in all ages and cultures as a lifelong commitment between man 
and woman, complementing each other.  Marriage brings together men and women, to raise children who 
ĚĞƐĐĞŶĚĨƌŽŵĂŬŶŽǁŶĨĂƚŚĞƌĂŶĚĂŬŶŽǁŶŵŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?EŝŐĞůŽŶD^WǁĂƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇƐƉĞĂŬĞƌŝŶƚŚĞ^ƚĂŐĞKŶĞ
debate who explicitly used complementarianism (traced to Christian doctrine) to found his opposition to the 
Bill: Official Report, November 20, 2013, col. 24664. 
21
 n.11 above at para.6. 
22
 n.11 above at para.11. 
23
 ƚ'ĞŶĞƐŝƐ ? P ? ?'ŽĚƐĂǇƐƚŽǀĞ ? “ƚŚǇĚĞƐŝƌĞƐŚĂůůďĞƚŽƚŚǇŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ĂŶĚŚĞƐŚĂůůƌƵůĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĞ ? ? ?dŝŵŽƚŚǇ
 ? P ? ?ŚĂƐ^ƚWĂƵůŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐdŝŵŽƚŚǇ P “/ĚŽŶŽƚƉĞƌŵŝƚĂǁŽŵĂŶƚŽƚĞĂĐŚŽƌƚŽ ĂƐƐƵŵĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽǀĞƌĂŵĂŶ ? ?
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in leadership roles such as bishops.24  Applying complementarian theology to 
marriage allows that institution to be one that both reflects and demands different 
gender roles. 
The problem with this argument, and the reason for its lack of purchase today, is that 
both the law and society as a whole long ago moved away from requiring or 
expecting different roles to be performed by the two genders within marriage.  There 
is no doubt that Scots law once embraced the scripturally mandated doctrine of 
complementarity, and thereby reinforced gender differences through the 
consequences of marriage.  6R(UVNLQHFRXOGZULWH ³7KHKXVEDQGDFTXLUHVE\ WKH
PDUULDJHDSRZHURYHUERWKWKHSHUVRQDQGHVWDWHRIWKHZLIH´25  Even as late as the 
middle years of the 20th Century it could still be written that: ³7KHKXVEDQGDV WKH
dignior persona is the head of the house.  As his duty is to love and cherish his wife, 
so hers is to love and obey him.  She comes under obligation to follow his fortunes, 
to live where he chooses, in all things lawful to obey him.  And this headship of the 
family is so inherent in the nature of marriage that an agreement by the husband to 
UHQRXQFHLWZRXOGEHYRLG´26  The influence of biblical descriptions RIWKHKXVEDQG¶V
GXW\ WR ORYH DV&KULVW ORYHGKLV FKXUFK DQG WKHZLIH¶VGXW\ WR REH\,27 is obvious.  
Today, however, after a long struggle,28 marriage in its legal consequences reflects 
the social understanding that relations between the genders should be based on 
equality and partnership, not domination and dependency.  Gender equality itself, 
embraced by most sections of British society, is the rejection of the idea that men 
and women have different roles to play, either within marriage, in the workplace or in 
the public sphere: rather it demands the same opportunities (including leadership 
roles) for everyone irrespective of gender (or indeed of gender-history). 
Neither the Roman Catholic Church nor the Church of England sought to have the 
consequences of marriage restored to a complementarian Shangri La, and the major 
weakness of the complementarian argument is that even religious traditionalists tend 
                                                            
24
 The Scriptural authority for preventing women from being priests or, if priests, preventing them from 
becoming bishops is often traced to 1 Corinthians 14:34, where St Paul instructed the Corinthians that 
 “ǁŽŵĞŶƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞŵĂin silent in churches. They are not allowed to speak, but must be in submission, as the 
>ĂǁƐĂǇƐ ? ?
25
 Institute of the Law of Scotland (1773), at I, vi, 19. 
26
 Walton on Husband and Wife (3
rd
 edn, 1951, by WER Hendry and AM Johnston) at p. 190. 
27
 As for example in Ephesians 5.25. 
28
 See n.39 below and accompanying text. 
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to limit it to two realms only: church governance and entry into marriage.  The 
challenge for traditional WKHRORJLDQV ZKLFK QR UHVSRQVH WR WKH *RYHUQPHQWV¶
consultations rose to, is to explain why complementarianism should continue to 
govern eligibility to marry but not the consequences of marriage.  Traditional 
marriage may well have been unable to accommodate same-sex couples because of 
the complementarity inherent in the patriarchal power-structure which for many 
FHQWXULHVZDVXQGHUSLQQHGE\WKHODZ¶VGHVLJQRIPDUULDJH, but modern marriage, as 
understood (and wanted) by the vast majority of the population in the western world 
as a partnership of equals, can accommodate same-sex couples just as readily as 
opposite-sex couples.  And it is good social policy for the law, through its design of 
all aspects of marriage, to encourage that more modern view of relationships.  The 
Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 does precisely this ± and no 
more. 
 
Marriage as Message 
³7KHUHFDQEHQRGRXEW´VDys &DVV6XQVWHLQ³WKDW ODZ OLNHDFWLRQ LQJHQHUDOKDV
an expressive function.  Some people do what they do mostly because of the 
statement the act makes; the same is true for those who seek changes in law.  Many 
debates over the appropriate content of law are really debates over the statement 
WKDWODZPDNHVLQGHSHQGHQWRILWVGLUHFWFRQVHTXHQFHV´29  This is especially true 
of debates on laws affecting gay men and lesbians, and same-sex couples.  We just 
need to remember the so-FDOOHG ³VHFWLRQ ´ RI XQKDSS\ PHPRU\30 whose 
substantive meaninglessness31 was never its point, which was to restore a legislative 
declaration of homosexual inferiority, which had been removed from the statute book 
by the decriminalisation of gay sex.  The desire to retain that message was what 
motivated those who were so virulently opposed to the repeal of section 28, and it 
has since motivated their opposition to the Civil Partnership Act 2004, the new 
adoption legislation, and both the (English) Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 
and the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014.  The irony is that it is the 
                                                            
29
  “KŶƚŚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ&ƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?h ?WĞŶŶ ?> ?Z ? ? ? ? ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ? ?
30
 Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988, inserting a new s.2A into the Local Government Act 1986, 
prŽŚŝďŝƚŝŶŐůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĨƌŽŵ “ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐŚŽŵŽƐĞǆƵĂůŝƚǇĂƐĂƉƌĞƚĞŶĚĞĚĨĂŵŝůǇƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?
31
 ^ĞĞEŽƌƌŝĞ ? “^ǇŵďŽůŝĐĂŶĚDĞĂŶŝŶŐůĞƐƐ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ?(1988) 33 JLSS 310. 
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power of Message that provides the strongest argument in favour of same-sex 
marriage. 
  
It has been the message carried by the opening of marriage to same-sex couples 
that has persuaded many judges around the world that equality is insufficiently 
achieved by the law providing a functionally equivalent institution to marriage which 
ODZ\HUVFDOO³FLYLOSDUWQHUVKLS´7KHSRLQWZDVILUVWDFFHSWHGE\WKH6XSUHPH-XGLFLDO
Court of Massachusetts, which had been explicitly asked by the state whether 
constitution-mandated equality would be achieved by a civil union (civil partnership) 
regime that carried the same legal rights and responsibilities as marriage.  In Opinion 
of the Justices,32 the Court held that a civil partnership model simply would not do. 
³The bill's DEVROXWHSURKLELWLRQRIWKHXVHRIWKHZRUGµPDUULDJH¶E\µVSRXVHV¶
who are the same sex is more than semantic. The dissimilitude between the 
WHUPV µFLYLO PDUULDJH¶ DQG µFLYLO XQLRQ¶ LV QRW LQQRFXRXV LW LV D FRQVLGHUHG
choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, 
largely homosexual, couples to second-class status « >7@KH TXHVWLRQ WKH
court considered in Goodridge33 was not only whether it was proper to 
withhold tangible benefits from same-sex couples, but also whether it was 
constitutional to create a separate class of citizens by status discrimination, 
and withhold from that class the right to participate in the institution of civil 
marriage, along with its concomitant tangible and intangible protections, 
EHQHILWVULJKWVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV´34 
The same conclusion was reached by Sachs J in the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa in Fourie v. Minister for Home Affairs,35 which led directly to the opening of 
marriage in South Africa:36 
³7KHH[FOXVLRQRIVDPH-sex couples from the benefits and responsibilities of 
marriage ... is not a small and tangential inconvenience resulting from a few 
surviving relicts of societal prejudice destined to evaporate like the morning 
                                                            
32
 (2004) 802 NE 2d 565. 
33
 (2003) 798 NE 2d 941. 
34
 (2004) 802 NE 2d at 570.  Numerous courts in the US have made similar comments, before and especially 
ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŝŶUnited States v Windsor 570 US 12 (2013). 
35
 2006 (1) SA 524. 
36
 ŝǀŝůhŶŝŽŶĐƚEŽ ? ? ?ŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?^ĞĞW ?ĞsŽƐĂŶĚ: ?ĂƌŶĂƌĚ ? “^ĂŵĞ^ĞǆDĂƌƌiage, Civil Union and 
Democratic Partnerships in South Africa: Critical Reflections on an On-ŐŽŝŶŐ^ĂŐĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?^>: ? ? ? ? 
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dew.  It represents a harsh if oblique statement by the law that same-sex 
couples are outsiders, and that their need for affirmation and protection of 
their intimate relations as human beings is somehow less than that of 
KHWHURVH[XDOFRXSOHV´37 
What all of this means is that while it may well be true that opening the institution of 
marriage to same-sex couples will not create much substantive legal effect beyond 
that already achieved by civil partnership and a strict compliance with the equality 
legislation, the real importance of the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 
2014 lies in its symbolic effect, by giving out a signal, stronger even than that 
afforded by the Civil Partnership Act 2004 or the equality legislation ± that gay 
people are no better and no worse than non-gay people.  This point is made time 
and again in the Scottish Parliamentary debates and was clearly a powerful factor 
there.38 
So, the real reason why opponents to same-sex marriage failed in their quest to 
prevent its introduction lies not in the relative weakness of their arguments but 
primarily in the fact that the message they wished marriage to carry ± that opposite-
sex couples are superior to same-sex couples ± is no longer a message acceptable 
to the Scottish Parliament, the courts or society as a whole.  Proponents of same-
sex marriage won the argument not on their claims to substantive equality but 
because the message they seek to give is the more important one, and is accepted 
by most people in modern, secular (if western) societies: contrary to many traditional 
religious doctrines, sexual orientation is not an appropriate basis upon which to 
make any judgment as to the worth of an individual, or how he or she chooses to 
conduct his or her private and family life. 
 
 
                                                            
37
 2006 (1) SA 524 at para. [71]. 
38
 See the State One debate, , Official Report, November 20, 2013 speeches by, amongst others, Jackie Baillie 
MSP, at col. 24640, Ruth Davidson MSP, at col. 24646, Jim Hume MSP, at col. 24658, and Alex Neil, MSP (and 
ĂďŝŶĞƚ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ? ?ĂƚĐŽů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚƚŚĞ^ƚĂŐĞdŚƌĞĞĞďĂƚ  ?ůĞǆEĞŝů ?D^W ?ǁĂƐĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ P “dŚŝƐ
legislation sends a powerful message to the world about the kind of society that we in Scotland are trying to 
ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ? POfficial Report, February 4, 2014, at col.27343. 
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The primary effect of the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 is, of 
course, to allow same-sex couples to marry instead of registering a civil partnership, 
but there are three other major effects.  First, just as the Act changes some of the 
rules of marriage (in particular eligibility), so too has it changed some of the rules of 
civil partnership (though not, some may consider oddly, the rules of eligibility, which 
remain gendered).  No longer is civil partnership to be a wholly secular institution 
with no religious implication or involvement, for the Act will allow civil partnership to 
be created in the same way as marriage is created ± either by registration at the 
hands of the district registrar, or by registration through religious ceremony.  
Secondly, religious organisations lose their monopoly over non-registrar creation: 
LQVWHDG RI ³UHOLJLRXV PDUULDJH´ FUHDWHG E\ FHOHEUDQWV ZKR EHORQJ WR ³UHOLJLRXV
ERGLHV´, there is to be ³UHOLJLRXV RU EHOLHI PDUULDJH´ DQG ³UHOLJLRXV RU EHOLHI FLYLO
SDUWQHUVKLS´ FUHDWHG E\ FHOHEUDQWV ZKR EHORQJ WR ³UHOLJLRXV RU EHOLHI ERGLHV´  $OO
religious organisations are, already, belief bodies but the expanded concept will now 
include non-religious bodies such as the Humanist Society Scotland.  Thirdly, and 
following on from this, there are to be greater controls than before on which religious 
and belief bodies are eligible to provide celebrants for either marriage or civil 
partnership: such bodies (other than the Church of Scotland) will need to satisfy 
VSHFLILHG ³TXDOLI\LQJ UHTXLUHPHQWV´ EHIRUH EHLQJ DEOH WR GR VR  In this way, it is 
hoped that Scots law will be more robust than previously in identifying, before any 
ceremony, sham and forced marriages and civil partnerships. 
 
Making Marriage Gender-Neutral 
In many respects the most straight-forward part of the Marriage and Civil Partnership 
(Scotland) Act 2014 is that which opens marriage to same-sex couples.  This is 
because that opening is the last, and relatively small, step in a process that began 
well over 100 years ago to turn away from the conception of marriage as a 
13 
 
relationship between unequals, where the roles socially expected and legally 
reinforced were very different for husbands than for wives.39  By the turn of the 21st 
century there were virtually no rules within marriage that differentiated between 
spouses on the basis of gender ± other than the eligibility rule that only men could 
marry women, and only women could marry men.  Removing that rule therefore had 
little consequence elsewhere in marriage law. 
Same-sex marriage is achieved through two amendments.  First, a definition of 
³PDUULDJH´ LV LQVHUWHG LQWR V RI the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 to mean 
³PDUULDJHEHWZHHQSHUVRQVRIGLIIHUHQWVH[HVDQGPDUULDJHEHWZHHQSHUVRQVRIWKH
VDPHVH[´40 DQGLWIXUWKHUSURYLGHVWKDWWKHZRUG³PDUULDJH´DQGUHODWHGH[SUHVVLRQV
in any enactment, whether passed or made subsequent or prior to the 2014 Act, are 
to be interpreted to include marriages between persons of different sexes and 
marriages between persons of the same sex;41 so too are references in any 
document unless it otherwise specifies.42  ³:LGRZ´ IRU H[DPSOH ZLOO LQFlude a 
ZRPDQZKRVHPDUULDJH WRDQRWKHUZRPDQHQGHGZLWK WKHRWKHUZRPDQ¶VGHDWK43  
Secondly, s.5(4)(e) of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 is repealed44: that was the 
provision that created an impediment to marriage (and imposed a duty on the district 
regisWUDUWRHQVXUHWKHPDUULDJHGRHVQRWJRDKHDGLI³ERth parties are of the same 
VH[´45  Consequentially, the rule in s.5(4)(f) of the 1977 Act that domiciliary 
incapacity imposed on one or both of the prospective parties by a foreign legal 
system amounts to a bar to marriage in Scotland is modified so that any domiciliary 
                                                            
39
 dŚĞDĂƌƌŝĞĚtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐWƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ĐƚƐ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ'ƵĂƌĚŝĂŶƐŚŝƉŽĨ/ŶĨĂŶƚƐĐƚ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 1984 are only the highlights of this movement. These 
developments are traced in detail by Clive, Husband and Wife (4
th
 edn. 1997) who, at para.01.019, says that 
the changes since 1830 in the legal consequences of marriage  “ĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŽŶŽƚŚŝŶŐůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶƚŚĞůĞŐĂů
emancipation of the married womaŶ ? ?
40
 2014 Act, s.4(13).  An identical definition is added to the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 
2010 so that the definition applies to legislation beyond the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977: 2014 Act, s.4(15). 
41
 2014 Act, s.4(1) and (5). 
42
 2014 Act, s.4(11)  W (13). 
43
 2014 Act, s.4(12). 
44
 2014 Act, s.2(9). 
45
 It is interesting to note that prior to 1977 there was no such rule  W at least not one expressed in statute.  
Scots law has never contained a statutory definition of marriage and it was only in the 1970s, when gay and 
lesbian people became more visible and began to assert their rights, that it was deemed necessary to exclude 
a possibility that had never seriously been raised before. 
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incapacity will be ignored if it is based only on the parties to the proposed marriage 
being of the same sex.46 
Gender neutrality of marriage is furthered in a number of other ways.  First, in order 
to save the additional complexities in describing the forbidden degrees of marriage in 
gendered terms, schedule 1 to the 1977 Act has been substantially simplified.  
Presently it lists in Column One all the female relatives that a man may not marry 
and in Column Two all the male relatives that a woman may not marry: these 
columns are replaced, without substantive change, by a single column in which the 
relevant terms are expressed (mostly) in gender-neutral terms.  So while, for 
example, the existing law prohibits a man from marrying his mother and a woman 
from marrying her father, the new law will (more straight-forwardly) prohibit a person 
from marrying their parent.47 
Secondly, s.3 of the 1977 Act, which requires notice of intention to marry to include 
³LQ WKHFDVHRIDZLGRZRUZLGRZHU WKHGHDWK FHUWLILFDWHRI WKH IRUPHU VSRXVH´ LV
amended so tKDW LWQRZ UHDGV ³LI WKHSHUVRQKDVSUHYLRXVO\EHHQPDUULHGDQG WKH
marriage ended on the death of the other party to that marriage, the death certificate 
RI WKDW RWKHU SDUW\´48  In truth, s.3 could have been worded thus even before 
marriage was opened to same-sex couples and the change is terminological rather 
than substantive.  More substantive is the amendment to s.3(5) of the 1977 Act 
which requires a party not domiciled in any part of the United Kingdom to submit with 
the notice of intention to marry a certificate of no legal incapacity, issued by a 
FRPSHWHQWDXWKRULW\LQWKHVWDWHRIWKHSDUW\¶VGRPLFLOH7KDWUHTXLUHPHQWKDVDOZD\V
been subject to a number of provisos, and the 2014 Act adds a new one: that no 
such certificate has been issued only be reason of the fact that the parties to the 
intended marriage are of the same sex.49  This has the same effect as the 
amendment to s.5(4)(f), discussed above: domiciliary incapacity based only on the 
                                                            
46
 2014 Act, s.2(b). 
47
 2014 Act, s.1, amending s.2 of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 and replacing Sched.1 thereto.  Only 
nephews and nieces do not have a gender-neutral collective term, so the concept is rendered in the new list in 
^ĐŚĞĚ ? ?ĂƐ “ŶĞƉŚĞǁŽƌŶŝĞĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?Đƚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “^ƉŽƵƐĞ ?ŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚŝŶŐĞŶĚĞƌĞĚƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞ-sex 
ŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŽŵĞĂŶ “ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ĨŽƌƐĂŵĞ-sex marriages: 
2014 Act, s.1(2)(c), inserting a new s.2(1C) into the 1977 Act.  Identical amendments are made to the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 (notwithstanding that civil partnership remains gender-specific): 2014 Act, s.24(3) 
amending s.86 of, and s.24(22) amending Sched.10 to, the Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
48
 2014 Act, s.3(2). 
49
 2014 Act, s.3(2)(c), amending 1977 Act, s.3(5). 
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GRPLFLOH¶V QRQ-recognition of same-sex marriage will not prevent such a marriage 
taking place in Scotland. 
Thirdly, the existing legal requirements (applicable in religious, and now belief, 
marriage ceremonies) (i) that the parties make a declaration that they accept each 
RWKHUDV³KXVEDQGDQGZLIH´DQG(ii) that the celebrant declare the couple now to be 
³KXVEDQGDQGZLIH´50 become options.  As an alternative, the declarations may now 
be that they accept each other ³DV VSRXVHV´(or as both husband and wife and/or as 
spouses) and that the couple ³are then married´ (or are both then husband and wife 
and/or then married).51  This ensures that religious or belief bodies who do not wish 
to acknowledge the gender-neutrality of marriage (and who will not offer same-sex 
marriage ceremonies) may continue, but are not required, to use gender-specific 
language in their own ceremonies. 
Fourthly, one of the very few gender-specific consequences of marriage that 
survived into the 21st century ± that a wife could not be guilty of resetting goods 
stolen by her husband52 ± is abolished.53  That rule could not apply to same-sex 
couples since it was based on a gendered power structure previously inherent in 
marriage and while the Bill as presented limited the rule to opposite-sex marriages, 
after further consideration it was accepted that the better approach was simply to 
abolish the rule completely, so expunging from Scottish marriage law the last 
remnant of a legal power imbalance in marriage.54 
Two related gendered rules, those concerning impotence and adultery, survive 
unaltered notwithstanding that they are defined by the common law in entirely 
gender-specific terms.  The rule that a marriage is voidable if one of the parties is 
incurably impotent is explicitly stated to have effect only in relation to marriage 
                                                            
50
 There are no equivalent requirements for civil marriages, though typically solemnisations by the district 
registrar take a similar form. 
51
 2014 Act, s.13(2)(f)(ii) and (iii), amending s.9(3) of the 1977 Act: these options are limited, of course, to 
marriages involving couples of the opposite sex (2014 Act, s.13(2)(f)(i) and (iv), amending s.9(3) of the 1977 
Act).  The gender-neutral formula set out in the 2014 Act, s.13(2)(g), inserting a new s.9(3A) into the 1977 Act, 
will be used for same-sex marriages. 
52
 See Smith v Watson 1982 S.L.T. 359. 
53
 2014 Act, s.7(1).  The abolition applies only in relation to things done after the day on which s.7 comes into 
force: s.7(2). 
54
 Government Amendment 8, accepted at Stage Two: Official Report Equal Opportunities Committee 
December 19, 2013, cols.1701-2. 
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between persons of different sexes.55  Adultery (the only ground for divorce not 
replicated in the Civil Partnership Act 2004 as a ground for dissolution) is explicitly 
stated to have the same meaning for same-sex marriage as it does for opposite-sex 
marriage.56  The hetero-specificity of adultery is not altered in any way but it will 
apply (unlike impotence) to all marriages irrespective of gender-mix.  This means 
that a married person who has sexual intercourse with a person of the opposite sex 
may be divorced for adultery by either their opposite-sex or their same-sex spouse; a 
party to a civil partnership may not have the partnership dissolved on that basis.  
(Likewise, a married person who has sexual relations with a person of the same sex 
may not be divorced for adultery, by either their opposite- sex or their same-sex 
spouse, because sexual activity of that nature does not amount to adultery ± though 
it may found the unreasonable behaviour ground for all couples in either type of 
relationship). 
 
Conversion of Civil Partnership into Marriage 
It is likely that many couples who registered their civil partnership under the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 would have preferred marriage, had it been available to them; 
it may also be expected that some couples who, in the future, register their 
relationship as a civil partnership (notwithstanding that marriage is now available to 
them) will change their minds and wish to be a married couple instead of civil 
partners.  The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 provides two 
methods of conversion and both apply irrespective of whether the civil partnership 
was registered before or after the coming into force of the Act.  First, there is to be 
an administrative process the details of which will be contained in regulations made 
by the Scottish Ministers.57  Secondly, the civil partners may, quite simply, get 
married58: in other words, an exception has been created to the otherwise universal 
rule that a person in a marriage or civil partnership is ineligible to marry or enter a 
                                                            
55
 2014 Act, s.5(1). 
56
 2014 Act, s.5(2), inserting a new s.1(3A) into the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976. 
57
 2014 Act, s.10.  In England and Wales, the equivalent regulations are being drafted as this article is being 
written, and will take effect some time after the rest of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 comes into 
force (March 29, 2014). 
58
 In England and Wales, only the administrative route is available (Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, s.9) 
and there is no equivalent to the marriage route. 
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civil partnership.59  This option was achieved in the 2014 Act by qualifying the rule in 
s.5(4)(b) of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, that there is an impediment to 
marriage if either or both of the prospective parties are already married or in a civil 
partnership, by adding in the words: ³RWKHUWKDQDTXDOLI\LQJFLYLOSDUWQHUVKLS´.60   
Both methods of conversion ± the administrative route and the marriage route ± are 
available only to couples in a ³TXDOLI\LQJ FLYLO SDUWQHUVKLS´.  This is one that was 
registered in Scotland (subject to the exception mentioned in the footnote) and has 
not been dissolved, annulled or ended by death.61  The Bill as presented went no 
further and the requirement that the civil partnership be registered in Scotland would 
have the effect of disallowing the conversion to marriage of any civil partnership 
registered outwith Scotland, whether by the administrative route or the marriage 
route.  So, for example, Scottish domiciliaries who had registered their civil 
partnership while on holiday abroad, or in England, would be ineligible to marry (or to 
convert their civil partnership to marriage by the administrative route), as would 
foreign nationals (or indeed couples originally domiciled in England) who came to 
live in Scotland after entering a civil partnership in their home country.  Arguments 
based on potential non-recognition abroad of the converted marriage were 
insufficient to justify this limitation (since same-sex marriages will be denied 
recognition in many of the countries of the world in any case) and at Stage Two the 
Bill was amended62 to give Scottish Ministers power to modify the meaning of 
³TXDOLI\LQJFLYLOSDUWQHUVKLS´WRLQFOXGHWKRVHUHJLVWHUHGHOVHZKHUHWKDQLQ6FRWODQG63 
                                                            
59
 Parties marrying each other while married to each other is not entirely unknown in Scots law: s.20 of the 
Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 permits this to happen when the original marriage took place abroad and the 
couple are unable to prove the validity of that foreign marriage. 
60
 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s.5(4)(b), as amended by 2014 Act, s.8(3)(a).  Notice of intention to marry, as 
governed by s.3 of the 1977 Act, must in these circumstances include an extract civil partnership certificate: 
2014 Act, s.8(2), inserting a new s.3(2)(bb) into the 1977 Act. 
61
 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s.5(6), as inserted by 2014 Act, s.8(3)(b).  A civil partnership registered outside 
the UK under an Order in Council made under the Civil Partnership Act 2004 will be treated as having been 
registered in Scotland (and so eligible for conversion to marriage through a marriage ceremony) if Scotland 
had been elected as the relevant part of the UK under the Order and details of the civil partnership have been 
sent to the Registrar General for Scotland: 1977 Act, s.5(7), as so inserted. 
62
 Official Report Equal Opportunities Committee, December 19, 2013, Col. 1710. 
63
 2014 Act, s.9. 
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Whether the civil partnership has been converted to marriage by the administrative 
route or by the marriage route, the civil partnership is brought to an end64 and the 
couple are treated for all purposes as having been married from the date of the 
registration of the civil partnership.65  So, unless the contrary is expressed in any 
enactment,66 the rights and liabilities that accrued to the civil partnership (which will 
nearly always be the same as the rights and liabilities accruing on marriage) will be 
preserved.  This is explicitly so in relation to a decree of aliment made under s.3 of 
the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 under which one member of a civil partnership is 
obliged to pay aliment to the other: the decree continues in effect and is exigible 
against the defender even although its terms refer to a civil partnership that is now 
terminated.67 Likewise in respect of an order regulating occupancy of the family 
home made under s.103(3) or (4) of the Civil Partnership Act 2004: that order will 
continue in effect after the termination of the civil partnership by its conversion to 
marriage as if it had been made under s.3(3) or (4) of the Matrimonial Proceedings 
(Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981.68  Section 11(7) and (8) of the 2014 Act are 
for the avoidance of doubt only. 
There is no provision allowing a same-sex couple who marry to convert that 
relationship into a civil partnership.  This is presumably for the same reason as civil 
partnership is not available to opposite-VH[FRXSOHVPDUULDJHLVWKHODZ¶VSUHIHUUHG
mechanism for regulating domestic relationships and choice is not to be extended in 
such a way as might diminish the numbers of people entering marriage. 
 
Who May Solemnise Marriage and Civil Partnership 
While the non-parliamentary opposition to opening marriage to same-sex couples 
was based almost entirely on religious arguments, it was apparent from an early 
stage that these arguments would have little effect in the parliamentary debates and, 
recognising that they were likely to be on the losing side of the major question, the 
                                                            
64
 2014 Act, s.11(9) amends s.1 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 as it applies in Scotland by adding marriage 
between the parties to the list of means by which a civil partnership is terminated (the others being death, 
dissolution or annulment). 
65
 2014 Act, s.11(2)(a) and (b). 
66
 2014 Act, s.11(4)  W (6). 
67
 2014 Act, s.11(7). 
68
 2014 Act, s.11(8). 
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parliamentary opposition focused their arguments on the fear that the protections for 
religious sensitivities were not drawn strongly enough in the Bill as originally 
presented.69  The major concession made to religious sensitivities in the Marriage 
and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 is a series of provisions designed to 
ensure that neither organisations nor individuals who are opposed to the legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships will be obliged to be involved in their legal 
creation.  This protects organisations and individuals from any legal obligation to act 
contrary to their own doctrinal beliefs, while at the same time ensuring that the 
doctrinal beliefs of one body are not imposed on other bodies with different beliefs, 
or on society as a whole: this is as much protection as religious bodies and 
individuals can rationally expect in a secular, inclusive, society.70  The relevant 
provisions apply to all same-sex relationships whether formalised as marriage or as 
civil partnership and they amend ss.8, 9 and 12 of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 
and the equivalent provisions in the Civil Partnership Act 2004, governing who may 
be authorised to solemnise, respectively, marriage and civil partnership. 
 
Amendments to Section 8 of the 1977 Act 
The existing rules for specifying who may solemnise marriages contained in s.8(1) of 
the 1977 Act will now apply only to opposite-sex marriages.71  At the same time, 
however, these rules are modified in three ways.  First, they will now apply to officials 
³RI D UHOLJLRXV RU EHOLHI ERG\´ LQVWHDG RI DV EHIRUH RIILFLDOV RI ³D UHOLJLRXV ERG\´ 
only.72  Humanist celebrants (for example) may now, therefore, be authorised as 
                                                            
69
 See for example the contribution to the Stage One Debate of John Mason, MSP, Official Report, November 
20, 2013, at col.24652- 4 and the amendments he proposed (unsuccessfully) at Stage Three (Official Report 
February 4, 2014, cols.27289 and 27297). 
70
 Further amendments to the Bill were proposed at Stage Two by John Mason, MSP, but rejected, which 
would have enshrined the right of any individual to express opposition to same-sex marriage: it was 
considered that existing protections of freedom of expression  W with their necessarily limitations  W were 
sufficient: see Official Report, Equal Opportunities Committee December 19, 2013, cols.1716-25.  The 2014 Act 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂƚƐ ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚ “&ŽƌƚŚĞĂǀŽŝĚĂŶĐĞŽĨĚŽƵďƚ ?ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚŝƐWĂƌƚƐŽĨĂƌĂƐŝƚŵĂŬĞƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝon for the 
marriage of persons of the same sex and as to the persons who may solemnise such marriages affects the 
exercise of (a) the Convention rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, (b) the Convention right 
to freedom of expression, or (c ?ĂŶǇĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚƌŝŐŚƚĐŽŶĨĞƌƌĞĚďǇƌƵůĞŽĨůĂǁ ? ? 
71
 2014 Act, s.12(2)(a), amending s.8(1) of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 2014. 
72
 2014 Act, s.12(2)(a)(ii).  Section 12(4) of the 2014 Act amends s.26 of the 1977 Act by substituting for the 
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐďŽĚǇ ?ĂŶĞǁĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐŽƌďĞůŝĞĨďŽĚǇ ? P “ĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚŐƌŽƵƉŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ă ?
which meets regularly for religious worship or (b) the principal object (or one of the principal objects) of which 
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members of a belief body to solemnise marriages under s.8(1).73  Secondly, the rule 
in s.8(1)(a)(i) of the 1977 Act that ministers of the Church of Scotland are 
automatically, without further authorisation, marriage celebrants is expanded so that 
the rule now applies also to Church of Scotland deacons.74 Thirdly, and most 
significantly, the power of Scottish Ministers to prescribe religious bodies (other than 
the Church of Scotland) whose officials may act as celebrants without further 
authorisation is to be limited and, in future, Scottish Ministers may prescribe a body 
only if that body requests them to do so and they are satisfied that the body meets 
the qualifying requirements.75  In this way Scottish Ministers have taken more control 
over which bodies are suitable to provide marriage celebrants.  The right and duty of 
district registrars to solemnise opposite-sex marriages76 remains unaffected. 
New rules, replicating (with two important differences) the amended rules just 
discussed in relation to opposite-sex marriage are created for marriages involving 
same sex couples.77  The most important replicated rules are the requirements that 
the religious or belief body requests to be prescribed, and that the body satisfies the 
qualifying requirements.78  In this way, only suitable religious or belief bodies that 
themselves wish to conduct same-sex marriage ceremonies may be authorised to do 
so.  The two differences from the rules relating to opposite-sex marriage are as 
follows.  First, there is no automatic right for ministers (or, now, deacons) of the 
Church of Scotland to solemnise marriages between same-sex couples.  That 
religious organisation has no special place in Scots law in relation to same-sex 
marriage equivalent to its special place in relation to opposite-sex marriage and it 
must seek to be prescribed as authorised to solemnise same-sex marriage in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
is to uphold or promote philosophical beliefs ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚŵĞĞƚƐƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇĨŽƌƚŚĂƚƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? ? An identical 
definition is inserted into s.135 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 by s.24(21)(c) of the 2014 Act. 
73
 As opposed to individual authorisations under s.12. 
74
 2014 Act, s.20, amending s.8(1)(a)(i) of the 1977 Act. 
75
 1977 Act, s.8(1A), as inserted by 2014 Act, s.12(2)(b).  The qualifying requirements will be specified in 
regulations but the Cabinet Secretary, Alex Neil, MSP, in the Stage One debate indicated that they will be 
designed to ensure that marriages are not conducted as a profit-making business, and that prescribed bodies 
are aware of the dangers of forced and sham marriages: Official Report, November 20, col.24631.  These were 
the policy objectives specified in the Policy Memorandum published with the Bill (SP Bill 36) 2013 at paras.65  W 
67. 
76
 1977 Act, s.8(1)(b). 
77
 1977 Act, s.8(1B)  W (1G), as inserted by 2014 Act, s.12(2)(b).  
78
 2014 Act, s.12(2)(b), inserting a new s.8(1C) into the 1977 Act in identical form to the new s.8(1A) in respect 
of opposite-sex marriages. 
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same way as any other religious or belief body.79  Secondly, in order to ensure that 
no organisation or individual member of a religious or belief body is legally obliged to 
be actively involved in the creation of a same-sex marriage, it is explicitly stated that 
nothing in the new s.8(1B)(a) or (1C)(a): 
(a) imposes a duty on any religious or belief body to make a request to become a 
prescribed body; 
(b) imposes a duty of any such body to nominate under s.9 any of its members to 
be registered as empowered to solemnise marriages between persons of the 
same sex; 
(c) imposes a duty of any person to apply for temporary authorisation under s.12 
to solemnise marriages between persons of the same sex; or 
(d) imposes a duty of any person who is an approved celebrant in relation to 
marriages between persons of the same sex to solemnise such marriages.80 
The first-mentioned provision allows a religious or belief body to request under s.8(1) 
to be authorised to solemnise opposite-sex marriages, without being obliged also to 
request authorisation to solemnise same-sex marriages.  The last-mentioned 
provision is of some importance since it is one of the strands of individual protection 
that goes beyond institutional protection.  A religious or belief body that accepts the 
legitimacy of same-sex marriage may have requested and been prescribed as 
entitled to solemnise marriage between persons of the same sex, but this provision 
allows any member of that body to refuse to participate in that which his own 
organisation permits.  This will avoid ministers from being obliged to leave their 
church if their church drops its opposition to same-sex marriage/civil partnership: 
internal debates may, in other words, be had without the risk of schism (a risk that 
Presbyterian churches have historically been particularly vulnerable to).  The other 
major strand of individual protection is that the Equality Act 2010 may not be used to 
FKDOOHQJH DQ\ LQGLYLGXDO PLQLVWHU¶V refusal to be involved in the solemnisation of a 
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 The Church of Scotland currently has no intention of seeking to be a prescribed body for this purpose, but its 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞƵŶĚĞƌŐŽŶĞ
for the Church to change its doctrinal position. 
80
 2014 Act, s.12(2)(b), inserting a new s.8(1D) into the 1977 Act.  District registrars, being authorised under 
s.8(1B)(b), are not included in this conscientious exemption.  At Stage Two Siobhan McMahon, MSP, 
unsuccessfully proposed an amendment to extend to district registrars and other public sector employees the 
right to opt out on conscientious grounds of any involvement with same-sex marriage solemnisation: Official 
Report Equal Opportunities Committee December 19, 2013, cols.1725-33. 
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same-sex marriage, for that Act is to be amended by the UK Government (it being a 
reserved matter81) to extend the religious exemptions from the equality imperative to 
individuals as well as organisations.82 
 
Amendments to Section 9 of the 1977 Act 
Section 9 of the 1977 Act allows for the registration of persons nominated as 
celebrants by religious bodies even although the religious body is not prescribed 
under s.8 (and is not the Church of Scotland).  Following the approach to the 
amendment of s.8, the 2014 Act limits the existing rules in s.9 of the 1977 Act to 
marriages between persons of different sexes,83 while varying these existing rules in 
two ways.  First, the 2014 Act expands s.9 EH\RQG³UHOLJLRXVERGLHV´DQGDOORZV the 
nomination of members of DQ\ ³UHOLJLRXV RU EHOLHI ERG\´ which is not prescribed 
under s.8 (and is not the Church of Scotland) to be registered as empowered to 
solemnise marriages.84  Secondly, the Registrar General is given the new power to 
reject the nomination iI WKH QRPLQDWLQJ ERG\ GRHV QRW PHHW WKH ³TXDOLI\LQJ
UHTXLUHPHQWV´85  Again following the structure of the amended s.8, entirely new rules 
are created for same-sex marriages, with a new s.9(1A) being inserted into the 1977 
Act with the same effect as the existing rules (as amended) for opposite-sex 
marriages.86  The only two differences are (i) that it is explicitly specified that nothing 
in s.8 (as amended) obliges any religious or belief body to nominate any of its 
members under s.9 to be registered as empowered to solemnise marriages between 
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 Scotland Act 1998, Sched.5, section L2.  Section 104 of the 1998 Act allows UK ministers to amend reserved 
matters by Order. 
82
 This was deemed necessary since the Equality Act 2010 contains in Schedule 23 exemptions for religious 
organisations where the equality requirements in the Act relating to sexual orientation would conflict with the 
doctrines of the organisation or with the strongly held convictions of a ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
members.  But this provides no exemption for an individual whose beliefs conflict with his or her own 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƐĞǆƵĂůŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?dŚĞĂŵĞŶĚŵĞŶƚƐƚŽƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĐƚǁŝůůƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞĨŽƌ
Scotland (though not precisely) the provision now contained in s.2(6) of the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 
2013.  They will provide protection not only to the celebrant but also to other persons who play an integral 
part in the religious or belief aspects of the ceremony.  This might include an organist, but would not include 
(for example) a chauffeur. 
83
 2014 Act, s.13(2)(a)(ii), amending s.9(1) of the 1977 Act. 
84
 2014 Act, s.13(2)(a)(i), amending s.9(1) of the 1977 Act. 
85
 2014 Act, s.13((2)(d), inserting a neǁƉĂƌĂ ?Ğ ?ŝŶƚŽƐ ? ? ? ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Đƚ ? “YƵĂůŝĨǇŝŶŐƌĞƋƵƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂƌĞ
those set out in regulations made by the Scottish Ministers: s.13(2)(e), inserting a new s.9(2A)  W (2C) into the 
1977 Act. 
86
 2014 Act, s.13(2)(b), inserting a new s.9(1A) into the 1977 Act. 
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persons of the same sex,87 and (ii) that there is no exclusion of the Church of 
Scotland from nominating celebrants.88   The register of celebrants that the Registrar 
General is obliged to keep under s.9(5) of the 1977 Act must now be in two parts, the 
first part containing the details of persons nominated by religious or belief bodies to 
solemnise opposite-sex marriages and the second part containing these details of 
persons nominated to solemnise same-sex marriages.89 
 
Amendments to Section 12 of the 1977 Act 
Section 12 of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 allows for the temporary 
authorisation of celebrants who are not otherwise able to act as celebrants under the 
provisions in ss.8 or 9.  As originally enacted, s.12 allowed the Registrar General to 
DXWKRULVH ³DQ\ SHUVRQ´ WR solemnise either a specified marriage or marriages, or 
marriages during a specified period of time.  The Marriage and Civil Partnership 
(Scotland) Act 2014, however, restricts the ability of the Registrar General, who may 
now authorise only members of a ³UHOLJLRXV RU EHOLHI ERG\´ ZKLFK PHHWV WKH
qualifying requirements:90 again, the Registrar General is given more control over 
celebrants than he had before, irrespective of the gender mix of the marriage in 
question.  The authorisation of an individual under s.12 of the 1977 Act (as 
amended) may be granted in relation to (a) only marriages between persons of 
different sexes, (b) only marriages between persons of the same sex, or (c) both;91 
and authorisation to solemnise marriages between persons of the same sex may 
only be granted if the person is a member of a prescribed body or the body has 
nominated members to solemnise same-sex marriages.92  No-one is obliged to apply 
for temporary authorisation.93 
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 2014 Act, s.12(2)(b), inserting a new s.8(1D)(b) into the 1977 Act. 
88
 Indeed, the Church of Scotland may find it politically easier to nominate individuals under the new s.9(1A) 
than to seek to be prescribed as an institution under the new s.8(1B). 
89
 2014 Act, s.13(2)(j), inserting a new s.9(5ZA) into the 1977 Act. 
90
 2014 Act, s.14(2)(a), amending s.12(1) of the 1977 Act; and 2014 Act, s.14(2)(b), inserting a new s.12(1A) into 
the 1977 Act. 
91
 2014 Act, s.14(2)(b), inserting a new s.12(1B) into the 1977 Act. 
92
 2014 Act, s.14(2)(b), inserting a new s.12(1C) into the 1977 Act. 
93
 2014 Act, s.12(2)(b), inserting a new s.8(1D)(d) into the 1977 Act. 
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Amendments to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 
Since civil partnership was originally conceived as the functional equivalent to civil 
marriage, there was no need for the Civil Partnership Act 2004 to replicate the rules 
concerning the authorisation of non-registrar celebrants.  However, the Marriage and 
Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 reconstructs civil partnership into the functional 
equivalent of all marriage and not just civil marriage: civil partnership may now be 
created by religious or belief ceremony as well as civil registration.94  It was 
necessary, therefore, to create rules, equivalent to those in ss.8, 9 and 12 of the 
Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, for the authorisation of non-registrar civil partnership 
celebrants.  These are to be found in s.24 of the Marriage and Civil Partnership 
(Scotland) Act 2014, which inserts new ss.94A ± 94E into the Civil Partnership Act 
2004.95  Civil partnership being limited to same-sex couples, the insertions into the 
2004 Act replicate only the new rules applicable to marriages for same-sex couples 
as inserted into the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 by the 2014 Act.  So the new 
s.94A of the 2004 Act, in specifying who may register a civil partnership, is in the 
same terms as the new s.8(1B) of the 1977 Act;96 the new s.94B of the 2004 Act, in 
allowing the registration of nominated persons and celebrants, is in the same terms 
as the new s.9(1A) of the 1977 Act;97 and the new s.94E of the 2004 Act, which 
allows for the temporary authorisation of celebrants, is in similar terms to s.12 of the 
1977 Act, as amended.  Civil registration of civil partnership98 is unaffected by these 
changes and remains available as an alternative to religious or belief registration. 
 
Place of Marriage and Civil Partnership 
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 2014 Act, s.24(2), amending s.85 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004.  Other parts of s.24 insert into the 2004 
Act provisions analogous to those relating to religious marriage in ss.6-16 of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, 
and s.24(19) inserts into s.100 of the 2004 Act offences analogous to those in s.24 of the 1977 Act. 
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 2014 Act, s.24(13). 
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 There is one ĐƵƌŝŽƵƐƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?dŚĞŶĞǁƐ ? ? ? ? ?ƚĂůŬƐŽĨ “ĂŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ĐůĞƌŐǇŵĂŶ ?ƉĂƐƚŽƌ ?
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ŽƌďĞůŝĞĨďŽĚǇ ? ?DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐĂŶĚƉƌŝĞƐƚƐŵĂǇŶŽǁ register civil partnerships, but the legislation does not 
advertise this loudly. 
97
 Likewise, the new s.94C of the 2004 Act replicates the existing s.10 of the 1977 Act and the new s.94D 
replicates the existing s.11. 
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The place at which a marriage ceremony is permitted to be conducted has never 
been a matter of much concern in Scots law, where the control mechanism has 
traditionally lain more in whom is authorised to celebrate the marriage than where it 
might be done.99  It has always been possible to conduct a religious marriage 
ceremony anywhere in Scotland that has been agreed to by the parties and the 
celebrant.  Civil marriage, on the other hand, when introduced in 1939 could be 
solemnised (with only minor exceptions) at the registration office of the relevant local 
authority.100  That remained the rule until the Marriage (Scotland) Act 2002 amended 
the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 by giving Scottish Ministers authority to permit 
registrars to solemnise civil marriages in any place that had been approved by the 
relevant local authority101: the system for approval was established shortly 
thereafter102 and that system in its original form prohibited approval of a place if the 
use of that place for civil marriage would be incompatible with a religion or religious 
practice to which the place has a connection. 
When the Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into force the registration of civil 
partnership at any place with a present or previous religious connection was 
SURKLELWHG LUUHVSHFWLYH RI FLYLO SDUWQHUVKLS¶V FRPSDWLELOLW\ RU RWKHUZLVH ZLWK WKH
religion with which the place was associated.103  This created an inconsistency 
between civil partnership and civil marriage.  The response of the Scottish 
Government was to amend the 2002 Regulations for civil marriage and to apply to 
marriage the more restrictive rule already applicable to civil partnership.104 
The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 substantially simplifies s.18 
of the 1977 Act and civil marriages may now be solemnised at a registration office, at 
                                                            
99
 This is to be compared with English law where religious marriages and civil marriages have long been subject 
to limitations on venue.  For religious marriages the issue was recently explored in detail in the Supreme Court 
ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐĨĂĐĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ^ĐŝĞŶƚŽůŽŐǇǁĂƐĂ “ƌĞůŝŐŝŽŶ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞWůĂĐĞƐŽĨ
Worship Registration Act 1855 and so able to offer marriage ceremonies on its own premises: R (on the 
Application of Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77. 
100
 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1939; Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s.18. 
101
 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s.18A, as inserted by Marriage (Scotland) Act 2002, s.1(3). 
102
 Marriage (Approval of Places) (Scotland) Regulations 2002 (SSI 2002/260). 
103
 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s.6 (for England and Wales), s.93 (for Scotland).  There is a different rule for 
Northern Ireland in s.144. 
104
 Marriage (Approval of Places) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2005 (SSI 2005/657), reg 2, amending reg 
7 of the 2002 Regs. 
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DQ³DSSURSULDWHSODFH´UDWKHUWKDQDQDSSURYHGSODFH, or in Scottish waters.105  The 
rules for approval of places are repealed for civil marriage,106 and replaced with a 
general prohibition on civil marriage being solemnised or registered in religious 
premises;107 this prohibition is applied to civil registration of civil partnership by 
similar amendments to the Civil Partnership Act 2004.108  The overall effect is that 
instead of the local authority having the burden of determining whether to approve a 
place as suitable for civil marriage or civil partnership, the district registrar is to 
determine in each case whether the proposed place of marriage or civil partnership 
is appropriate ± ZKLFK LWZLOOQRWEH LI LW LV ³religious´DVGHILQHG.  There has never 
been any statutory limitation on where a religious marriage may take place, and it 
may be assumed (in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary and 
EHFDXVHDOOUXOHVUHODWLQJWRUHOLJLRXVPDUULDJHDUHH[WHQGHGWR³UHOLJLRXVDQGEHOLHI´
marriage) that there is similarly no limitation on where a belief marriage (or belief civil 
partnership) may be solemnised.  In sum, religious premises (as defined in the 1977 
Act) may be used for religious marriages and religious registration of civil 
partnerships, and also for non-religious belief marriages or civil partnerships, but 
may not be used for civil marriages or the civil registration of civil partnerships. 
 
Other Changes to Marriage and Civil Partnership Law 
Bigamy 
The common law offence of bigamy ³consists in the contraction of a formally valid 
second marriage by a person who LVDSDUW\WRDSULRUVXEVLVWLQJYDOLGPDUULDJH´;109 
s.100 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 creates an equivalent (if unnamed) offence of 
registering a civil partnership while already married or in a civil partnership.  It was, 
however, unclear whether the common law would extend the offence of bigamy to 
include marrying while in a civil partnership.  Section 28 of the Marriage and Civil 
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 2014 Act, s.21(2)(a), amending s.18(1) of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977; 2014 Act, s.24(10)(a), amending 
s.93 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
106
 2014 Act, s.21(3), repealing s.18A of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
107
 2014 Act, s.21 ? ? ? ?ď ? ?ŝŶƐĞƌƚŝŶŐĂŶĞǁƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞDĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Đƚ ? ? ? ? ? “ZĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐ ?
ĂƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚƚŽŵĞĂŶƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚ “ ?Ă ?ĂƌĞƵƐĞĚƐŽůĞůǇŽƌŵĂŝŶůǇĨŽƌƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽƌ ?ď ?ŚĂve been so 
used and have not subsequently been used solely ŽƌŵĂŝŶůǇĨŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ? ?
108
 2014 Act, s.24(10)(b), amending s.93 by inserting a new s.93(1A) and repealing s.93(2) and (3). 
109
 Gordon, Criminal Law, (3
rd
 edn. by MGA Christie 2001) at para.45.02. 
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Partnership Act 2014 therefore abolishes the common law offence completely,110 
amends the 2004 Act so that the crime is committed when a person ³SXUSRUWV WR
UHJLVWHU´LQVWHDGRIDVRULJLQDOO\SDVVHG³UHJLVWHUV´) a civil partnership while already 
married or in a civil partnership,111 and creates a new offence (applicable of course 
irrespective of the genders of the parties) of purporting to enter into a marriage with 
another person knowing that either or both is already married to or in a civil 
partnership with someone else.112  Consequentially, the reference to the crime of 
bigamy in s.13 of the Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act 1977, which provides a 
defence to the charge when the spouse of the accused has been missing for at least 
seven years, is amended and the defence now applies to both the new offence and 
the offence in s.100 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004.113 
  
Marriage by Cohabitation with Habit and Repute 
This common law doctrine was mostly abolished by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 
2006, though it might still apply to save marriages contracted (ineffectually) abroad if 
various conditions are met.114 There was no statutory equivalent that could be 
utilised to save civil partnerships registered (ineffectually) abroad, nor any guarantee 
that a same-sex couple who married (ineffectually) abroad would be able to rely on 
the common law doctrine.  This meant that the limited saving in 2006 of marriage by 
cohabitation with habit and repute offered a potential benefit to opposite-sex couples 
only.  This discrimination is removed, though not wholly, by s.4(6) of the Marriage 
and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, which provides that: 
³,Q VR IDU DV EHLQJ RU KDYLQJ EHHQ PDUULHG RU LQ D SXUSRUWHG PDUULDJH LV
relevant for the operation of any rule of law, the rule of law applies equally in 
relation to marriage or purported marriage to a person of a different sex and 
marULDJHRUSXUSRUWHGPDUULDJHWRDSHUVRQRIWKHVDPHVH[´115 
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 2014 Act, s.28(3). 
111
 2014 Act, s.28(2), amending s.100 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
112
 2014 Act, s.28(1), inserting new s.24(A1) and (A2) into the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
113
 2014 Act, s.28(4). 
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 See Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s.3(3) and (4). 
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 dŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŽ “ĂƉƵƌƉŽƌƚĞĚŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?ǁĞƌĞĂĚĚĞĚďǇ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŵĞŶĚŵĞŶƚĂƚ^ƚĂŐĞdǁŽ ? 
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The effect of this is to extend the law of marriage by cohabitation with habit and 
repute to same-sex couples who have married (ineffectually) abroad (so long as the 
other conditions in s.3 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 are satisfied).  There 
remains a gap in the law, however, in that a civil partnership (ineffectually) registered 
abroad is not saved by any equivalent rule, and since a civil partnership contracted 
abroad is unlikely to be reJDUGHG LQ6FRWODQGDVD ³SXUSRUWHGPDUULDJH´ZLWKLQ WKH
meaning of s.4(6) of the 2014 Act,116 same-sex couples¶ relationships will remain 
more vulnerable than those of opposite-sex couples.  The eventual abolition in 
Scotland of civil partnership will not resolve this problem unless, at the same time, all 
overseas civil partnerships are treated for all purposes of Scots law as marriages. 
 
Evidence of Nationality 
In an entirely new provision, applicable irrespective of the gender-mix of the parties, 
the district registrar is given the power to require persons submitting a marriage 
notice or a civil partnership notice to provide specified evidence117 of the nationality 
of each of the parties to the marriage.118  The intent behind this provision was to 
allow the verification of the information provided on the marriage and civil partnership 
notice forms, to monitor where couples marrying or registering a civil partnership in 
Scotland come from in terms of national patterns and trends, to combat sham and 
forced marriages, and to enable the district registrar to remind any non-UK nationals 
that they may wish to take steps to ensure that the marriage or civil partnership is 
recognised in their own country.119 
 
Notice Periods 
Prior to the 2014 Act coming into force, persons intending to marry or register a civil 
partnership were obliged to give 14 days notice: this was achieved by prohibiting the 
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 And will not be regarded as a civil partnership under the Civil Partnership Act 2004 if ineffectual in the place 
of registration: 2004 Act, s.214. 
117
 To be specified in Guidance issued by the Registrar General. 
118
 2014 Act, s.17(2), inserting into s.3 of the 1977 Act new subss.(4A)-(4C); 2014 Act, s.25, inserting into s.88 of 
the Civil Partnership Act 2004 new subss.(8)-(10). 
119
 Policy Memorandum, attached to Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Bill (SP Bill 36) 2013, para [47]. 
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district registrar from issuing the marriage or civil partnership schedule within 14 
GD\VRI WKH UHJLVWUDU¶V UHFHLSWRI WKHPDUULDJHRUFLYLOSDUWQHUVKLSQRWLFH,120 or from 
issuing a certificate of non-impediment to marriage or civil partnership outside 
Scotland within 14 days of receipt of the marriage or civil partnership notice,121 or 
from solemnising a marriage or registering a civil partnership within 14 days of that 
receipt.122  The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 extends these 14 
day periods to 28 days.123  This is designed to give the district registrar more time to 
ensure the proposed marriage or civil partnership is not sham or forced. 
 
Jurisdiction 
The Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 governs jurisdiction of the 
sheriff court in actions for declarator of nullity of marriage124 and the Marriage and 
Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 Act extends that jurisdiction to include actions 
for declarator of marriage.125  This has the effect of resolving a potential 
inconsistency between the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s.4 of which removed 
the exclusion of sheriff court jurisdiction to deal with actions of declarator of marriage 
and nullity of marriage,126 and s.8 of the 1973 Act which conferred jurisdiction on the 
sheriff to hear actions for declaratory of nullity of marriage but was silent in respect of 
declarators of marriage.  The rules in the 1973 Act, as amended, apply only to 
opposite-sex marriage,127 and Schedule 1 to the 2014 Act sets out the general 
jurisdiction rules for proceedings relating to same-sex marriages.  These rules are 
similar to those relating to opposite-sex marriages, and Scottish Ministers are given 
the power to make regulations dealing with couples one or both of whom are from an 
EU member state, and in particular to make provision corresponding to that made by 
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 1977 Act, s.6(4); Civil Partnership Act 2004, s.94. 
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 1977 Act, s.7(2); Civil Partnership Act 2004, s.97(4). 
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 1977 Act, s.19(1); Civil Partnership Act 2004, s.90(2). 
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 2014 Act, s.18(2), amending ss.6, 7 and 19 of the 1977 Act; 2014 Act, s.24(7), (8), (12) and (18) amending 
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 Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s.8. 
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 2014 Act, s.23(2).  The conditions to be satisfied for jurisdiction are set out in 2014 Act, s.23(3), inserting a 
new s.8(2ZA) into the 1973 Act. 
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 Contained in s.5(1) of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907. 
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 2014 Act, Sched. 1 para 1(2). 
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Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 in relation to jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters.128 
 
Cohabiting Couples 
Cohabitants have always been defined by reference to how married couples live 
their lives (which, until Ghaidan v Mendoza129 excluded same-sex couples from the 
rights and liabilities of cohabitation).  Same-sex cohabitants have, since the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004, been defined by reference to how civil partners lead their lives, 
and have been fully covered in the cohabitation legislation since the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006.  Two definitions for cohabitation, depending upon gender-mix, 
became unnecessary when same-sex couples acquired the like ability as opposite-
sex couples to marry and so s.4(2) and (3) of the Marriage and Civil Partnership 
(Scotland) Act 2014 provides that any reference in statute to couples who are living 
together as if husband and wife is to be taken to include two people of the same sex 
who are not married to nor civil partners of each other.  Consequentially, all 
references to couples who are living together as if they were civil partners are of no 
further use and so are to cease to have effect.130  The dominant domestic 
relationship for couples of all gender mixes is that of marriage, and cohabitants of 
any gender mix are now those who live as if married: civil partnership is becoming 
more and more side-lined as an institution. 
 
Transgender Issues 
One of the most substantial FRPSOH[LWLHV FUHDWHG E\ WKH ODZ¶V SUHYLRXV LQVLVWHQFH
that marriage required an opposite-sex couple and its continuing insistence that civil 
partnership requires a same-sex couple concerns the interplay between the marriage 
and civil partnership rules and the rules governing change of gender under the 
Gender Recognition Act 2004.  A major iniquity in the law was that a person in a 
marriage or civil partnership who changed gender (socially and medically) could not 
be issued D IXOO JHQGHU UHFRJQLWLRQ FHUWLILFDWH KHUHLQDIWHU ³*5&´ while that 
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 2014 Act, Sched.1 para 2. 
129
 [2004] UKSC 30. 
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relationship was extant: only an interim GRC could be issued, the effect of which 
was to give a ground for divorce or dissolution.131  If the parties wished their 
marriage or civil partnership to continue after one of the parties had changed gender 
they were therefore obliged to bring their legal relationship to an end (using the 
interim GRC as the ground for divorce or dissolution).  The transgendered individual 
could then obtain a full GRC from the Gender Recognition Panel, and the parties 
were then free to re-establish their legal relationship, either as a civil partnership (if 
they had previously been married) or a marriage (if they have previously been civilly 
empartnered).  The need for this undignified clumsiness was removed by the 
rejection by the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 of the imperative 
to keep marriage an exclusively opposite-sex relationship, and so Schedule 2 to the 
2014 Act amends the Gender Recognition Act 2004, as it applies to Scotland.132  
The new rules apply in respect of ³SURWHFWHG 6FRWWLVK PDUULDJHs´ DQG ³SURWHFWHG
Scottish civil partnerships´133 
An application for a GRC must, if the applicant is a party to a protected Scottish 
marriage, include a declaration that the applicant wishes the marriage to continue 
DQGHLWKHUDVWDWXWRU\GHFODUDWLRQE\WKHDSSOLFDQW¶VVSRXVHWKDWWKHVSRXVHFRQVHQWV
to the marriage continuing after the issue of the GRC or, if the spouse does not so 
consent, a declaration that no such declaration of consent is included.134  The 
Gender Recognition Panel will issue either a full GRC if the applicant¶V spouse has 
consented to the marriage continuing,135 or an interim GRC if the spouse does not so 
consent.136  In that latter case, the person to whom the interim GRC was issued may 
then apply to the sheriff for a full GRC and, so long as the application was made 
within 6 months of the interim GRC, the sheriff must issue the full GRC.137  The 
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 2014 Act, s.29 and Sched. 2. 
133
 Defined in s.25 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, as inserted by 2014 Act, Sched.2 para (2) to mean 
marriages solemnised and civil partnerships registered in Scotland. 
134
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issuing of the full GRC (whether by the Gender Recognition Panel or the sheriff) 
does not affect the continuity of a protected Scottish marriage.138 
The spouse of a person who has undergone gender reassignment cannot veto the 
SHUVRQ¶Vlegal change of gender, for the sheriff is obliged to issue the full GRC when 
requested under these provisions.  The interest of the spouse who does not wish 
their marriage to continue in a gender-mix different from that with which it had started 
is sufficiently protected by ensuring that the ground of divorce they obtained on the 
issuing of the interim GRC does not fall when the sheriff issues a full GRC.139  The 
ground for divorce may be used even years after the issuing of the full GRC, and it is 
to be noted that it might be used by either party: there is no requirement it is the 
defender who holds the GRC. 
When a party to a civil partnership seeks a GRC, that partnership cannot continue 
since a same-sex relationship is becoming an opposite-sex relationship, which a civil 
partnership cannot be.  So it must still be brought to an end and re-established (if 
desired) as a marriage.  A full GRC can, however, be issued to a party to a civil 
partnership if, on the same day, a GRC is issued to the other party too.140 
In addition to these changes, Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the Marriage and Civil 
Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, added as an amendment at Stage Two,141 provides 
D³IDVW WUDFN´PHFKDQLVPIRU WKHREWDLQLQJRID*5&IRU LQGLYLGXDOVZKRKDYHEHHQ
living in the acquired gender for six years prior to the commencement of the Act so 
long as they are party to a protected Scottish marriage or a protected Scottish civil 
partnership.142  The limitation of this fast track mechanism to individuals who are in a 
marriage or civil partnership is based on no principle other than the political 
requirement that amendments be within the scope of the Bill in which they are 
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 2014 Act, Sched.2(10), inserting a new s.11C into the Gender Recognition Act 2004.  The parties to the 
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contained: the Gender Recognition Act 2004 was considered amenable to 






The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, being mostly composed of 
amendments to existing legislation, is not an easy Act to read, but the complexity of 
its structure must not blind us to the simplicity of its effects.  Its primary effect, of 
course, is to open the institution of marriage to same-sex couples, and the terms of 
the statute are in large measure consequential upon that simple goal.  Though 
opponents saw, and may continue to see, the opening of marriage as a radical 
subversion of millennia of tradition, in truth the Act is better seen as part of the end 
game in the century-long movement towards gender equality within family law.  That 
movement cannot today be seen as remotely radical, or disturbing, or wrong, and the 
opening of marriage to same-sex couples is far less transformative, in strictly legal 
terms, than opponents feared.  The work in transforming the legal position of gay 
men and lesbians had mostly been done with the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and the 
extension of non-discrimination norms to sexual orientation.  Scottish family law after 
2014 will not operate radically differently from Scottish family law in 2013.  More 
people who want to marry each other will now be able to do so than previously, but 
that happens every time the forbidden degrees of marriage are loosened.  The true 
significance of the 2014 Act, recognised by many of the speakers in the Scottish 
parliamentary debates, is not the minor changes in legal rules that it contains but the 
social message that it broadcasts loud and clearDSHUVRQ¶VVH[XDORULHQWDWLRQsays 
QRWKLQJDERXWWKDWSHUVRQ¶VZRUWK.  This message is more than one of toleration for 
gay and lesbian people and for same-sex couples, but it is less than one of 
celebration for gayness and lesbianism.  Quite simply, it is one that declares the 
moral neutrality, even moral irrelevance, of sexual orientation.  Whether one accepts 
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that the state should by legislation be giving that message depends ultimately on 
whether one accepts the proposition in the first place. 
